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Abstract The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed
opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrep-
ancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently
large, it is possible to construct approximations of both the average vote and the aver-
age taste which may be readily compared. We construct upper and lower bounds for
the limit average vote that depend on the limit average taste. If the average taste is cen-
tral enough, the range of possible values for the average voting outcome is narrower
than the corresponding range for majority voting. For instance, if the average taste is
at 1/2, the limit equilibrium outcome is this value plus or minus roughly .2, whereas
the weighted median maybe anywhere in the [0,1] interval.
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1 Introduction
In response to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975)
much attention has been devoted to truthful implementation. Since his first published
paper (Barbera 1977), Salvador Barbera has never stopped offering new deep insights
of the requirement of strategy-proofness in a voting context (see his overview, Barbera
2006, 2011). Yet, strategy-proofness or less restrictive criteria, like Nash or Bayesian
incentive compatibility, rule out some simple voting rules that are commonly used in
practice as, for instance, plurality in political elections or Borda count in committee
decisions. When dealing with such rules that allow for strategic manipulation, it is
useful to assess the extent of the manipulation by performing a comparison of the out-
come of strategic behavior with that of sincere voting. The latter is a natural benchmark
since one might expect those who chose these rules at a constitutional stage to view
them as appropriate modes of preference aggregation. Here we present a method for
evaluating the extent of the distortion introduced by strategic manipulation, in other
words the strategic bias, in the case of the average voting rule.
It is a very simple voting scheme that implements a weighted arithmetic mean of
votes. Several countries have adopted procedures for allocating public funds, that may
be described by a “forced to pay yet free to choose” mechanism. It turns out that the
outcome of this mechanism can be regarded as a weighted average vote. In Spain, tax
payers may earmark up to 0.5% of their income tax to the catholic church or to non-
governmental organisations and similar provisions can be found in Italy or Portugal. In
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Saskatchewan, there are publicly financed separate
school boards for Catholic schools along with the public school boards; households
may choose which school system receives their property taxes. In France, high schools,
colleges and universities are partly financed by a “training tax” that firms must pay,1
although they may decide on its allocation among different teaching institutions or
training programs. Typically, firms and more particularly small ones choose to finance
only one institution even if they can choose to subsidy as many institutions as they
want. These tax mechanisms and more precisely the training tax2 are formally equiv-
alent to weighted average voting rules. If there are only two possible uses of public
funds, the vote of a tax payer is the fraction of her taxes that she chooses to allocate
to one of them. Then the outcome of the vote (the proportion of public funds going to
either use) is a weighted average of the votes, where the weight of each voter is her
share in total tax contributions. Although the weights represent the individual shares
in total wealth or in total tax contribution in all actual applications of the average vote
that we are aware of, the interpretation of the weights may be broader.3 For instance,
1 Payrolls are taxed at a 0.5% rate, which yields a revenue of e2 billion in 2011. In comparison, the reve-
nues of the wealth tax are e3 billion. 22% of the budget of the second most well-known French business
school, ESSEC, comes from this channel, whereas the proportion is still between 10 and 15% for other
French business schools.
2 The vote itself is constrained to discrete values in some of the tax mechanisms to which we allude above.
In this case, there is an important difference with the model presented in the paper where the choice interval
varies in the interval [0, 1].
3 Average voting is here considered as a direct democracy mechanism. There are a number of papers in the
political economy literature that describe the democratic political process as achieving a compromise
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if each voter represents a group (household, constituency, country …), the weight may
be the share of this group in the overall population.
Although there are numerous examples of its application, the average voting rule
has only attracted limited attention. We know that sincere average vote yields an effi-
cient outcome, if agent’s preferences are Euclidean. In this case, the set of Pareto
outcomes is identical to the set of weighted average votes. If there at least five agents,
agents have Lipschitz utility functions and the voting space is multidimensional, the
average voting rule is shown to be the unique anonymous and unanimous voting rule
that satisfies a weakening of strategy-proofness in large voting problems (Ehlers et al.
2004). Bilodeau (1994) in his study of tax-earmarking institutions shows that leaving
the spending decisions in the hands of tax payers yields a unique non-cooperative
equilibrium in the core. Renault and Trannoy (2005a) exhibit circumstances where
the average rule may be more suited to protect minorities than majority voting, taking
into account the strategic behavior of voters. They also found that the equilibrium of
the game in large population converges to the same fixed-point whatever the informa-
tional framework of the game, complete or incomplete (Renault and Trannoy 2005b).
Marchese and Montefiori (2010) provide the first experiment of the manipulability
of the average rule. They do not find a strong misrepresentation of preferences and
the outcome of the game seems intermediate with respect to a sincere revelation of
preferences and the outcome deriving from a strategic behavior.
The first objective of this paper is to check that the use of an average rule cannot be
dismissed on the basis of a normative argument. To this end an axiomatic characteriza-
tion of the average social choice rule is provided based on the idea that if the opinions
of two individuals are moved in opposite directions with the same magnitude, the
collective choice remains unchanged. Thus, contrary to the median, the mean allows
for taking account of the magnitude in differences of opinions. However, even if one
agrees that this is a desirable property there remains a problem with implementing such
a rule. It is neither implementable in dominant strategy nor in a Nash equilibrium. The
main part of the paper is devoted to characterizing the outcome of a voting procedure
reflecting the average of expressed opinions when participants behave strategically,
and to an evaluation of the magnitude of the strategic bias.
In the average voting game considered here, individuals choose an alternative in the
[0,1] interval and preferences are supposed to be single-peaked in order to allow an
easy comparison of the outcome of the game with that of majority voting. In particular
we compare the strategic bias in average voting with the discrepancy between the
average and the median taste, which serves as a benchmark. Indeed, a distortion from
the average taste that would exceed that obtained by using the strategy-proof majority
rule would seem particularly unsatisfactory.
The game is studied in a complete information context. The agent’s Nash equilib-
rium behavior is typically to vote either 0 or 1, which is in tune with the empirical
evidence for the training tax. The characterization of the equilibrium outcome is quite
Footnote 3 continued
modeled as a convex combination of the political platforms of the various parties (see Alesina and Rosenthal
1995, 1996). The weights depend on the distribution of votes among parties and there is therefore some
formal equivalence with average voting, which is exploited in Gerber and Ortuno-Ortin (1998).
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clean and allows for an easy comparison with the outcome of a majority vote. It is
less obvious how it relates to the average taste. However, if the population is suffi-
ciently large, it is possible to construct approximations of both the average vote and
the average taste that may be readily compared: the limit equilibrium allocation is
characterized by a simple fixed point relation involving a function that, for all possible
levels of the allocation y, indicates the expected relative weight of those who favor
an outcome above y; the integral of this same function approximates the average taste
for a large population.
These approximation results allow us to construct upper and lower bounds for the
limit average vote that depend upon the limit average taste. Average voting prevents
the outcome from being too extreme when the average opinion is central. It restricts
the range of the social outcome more than the majority rule. For instance, if the aver-
age taste is at 1/2, the limit equilibrium outcome is within plus or minus roughly .2
around this value, whereas the weighted median may lie anywhere in the [0,1] inter-
val. This result shows that in a very polarized society where a large number of voters
have extreme opinions 0 or 1, average voting is better suited than majority voting for
achieving a compromise, i.e. an outcome different from the most extreme opinions.4
Moreover, the strategic bias is at most .21, again reached for an average taste of one
half. When the average taste is closer to one of the boundaries of the choice space,
namely the average taste is smaller than 1/4 or larger than 3/4, the strategic bias may
be more important than the gap between the average and the weighted median taste.
Indeed, the strategic power is much stronger for those who favor an outcome in the
center of the choice space; in this case they are all located on one side of the average
taste.
Section 2 presents an axiomatization of the weighted average voting rule in order
to shed some light on its normative properties. We gather what is known about the
average voting game in the following section. A limit approximation of the average
taste is provided in Sect. 4, as well as the main results regarding the approximation of
the Nash outcome in a complete information setting for large populations, the strategic
bias and the comparison with majority voting. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of results
are gathered in the appendix.
2 Normative foundations
The social choice problem under consideration is as follows. The social state y belongs
to the interval [0, 1]. There are n individuals indexed by i . Each voter’s preferences,
Ri , are single-peaked with b(Ri ) denoting the bliss point and are represented by a
continuous utility function, ui . The set of continuous single-peaked preferences on
[0, 1] is denoted S P . Each individual, i is endowed with a relative weight, w, where
w ≡ (w1, . . . , wn) is an element of the (n −1)-dimensional simplex Sn−1. The social
decision depends upon individual weights as well as preferences and is defined for
4 See Border and Jordan (1983), for a related formulation of the uncompromising nature of the median
rule. The majority rule does not exploit the continuity of the choice space which would allow for such a
compromise.
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any population size. A social choice rule is a mapping f : ∪∞n=1S Pn × Sn−1 → [0, 1].
An example of such a rule is the weighted average social choice rule which is defined
as follows.
Definition 2.1 The weighted average social choice rule fwa is defined by:




This section aims at providing an axiomatic characterization of this rule. For further
reference, we define the anonymous average social choice rule.
Definition 2.2 The average social choice rule with equal weights fa is defined by:





The first axiom is standard.
Definition 2.3 The social choice rule f :∪∞n=1S Pn × Sn−1 → [0, 1] is unanimous if
∀(R, w) ∈ ∪∞n=1S Pn × Sn−1 with wi =
1
n
∀i, f (R, w) = b (R1)
whenever Ri = R1 ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Unanimity is a weakening of Pareto efficiency. In order to single out the average
rule among unanimous rules, we introduce an axiom which has a natural interpretation
in the context of voting procedures.
Definition 2.4 The social choice rule f :∪∞n=1S Pn × Sn−1 → [0, 1] satisfies cancel-
lation of opposite changes in preferences if
∀(R, w), (R′, w) ∈ ∪∞n=1S Pn × Sn−1 with wi =
1
n





− b (R j




for some j and k, and
b (Ri ) = b
(
R′i
) ∀i 	= j, k.
In words, this axiom requires that the social choice is unaffected if two individuals
change opinions so that the moves are in opposite directions and have the same mag-
nitude. It turns out that this independence leads to the additivity property of the social
choice function. We now discuss its interpretation in relation with the Cancellation
axiom introduced by Ching.5 Ching’s condition may be stated as follows.
5 Ching (1995) has introduced this axiom in a characterization of the median social choice rule.
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Definition 2.5 A social choice rule f :∪∞n=1S Pn × Sn−1 → [0, 1] satisfies cancella-
tion of extreme preferences if, for any set of n voters, for any profile of preferences,
R ∈ S Pn , for any Rn+1 and Rn+2 in S P , if b(Rn+1) = 0 and b(Rn+2) = 1, then
f
(
R, Rn+1, Rn+2; 1n+2 , . . . , 1n+2
)
= f (R; 1n , . . . , 1n
)
.
This condition says that two additional voters should offset each other if they hold
opposite extreme opinions.
Typically a non dictatorial social choice rule strikes a balance between divergent
opinions. The two cancellation axioms provide two different approaches to how this
balancing act should be performed. Both deal with a symmetric change in the tastes
of the population. In the Ching axiom, the symmetry relates to the position of the new
members relative to the social choice. A bliss point at 0 is always below the social
choice while a bliss point at 1 is always above. All that is required for making such
statements is that the set of alternatives is ordered. In the axiom of cancellation of
opposite changes in preferences the symmetry relates to the moves in bliss points.
They must be in opposite directions and have the same magnitude. This condition
exploits the normed linear space structure of the set of social alternatives.
It can be shown that the first cancellation axiom along with unanimity are sufficient
to characterize the average rule with equal weights.6 One interesting consequence of
this result is that for unanimous social choice rules and single-peaked preferences, the
two cancellation axioms are incompatible with each other since the unweighted aver-
age voting rule does not satisfy cancellation of extreme preferences. Thus the choice
between the two principles cannot be avoided.
In order to tackle the characterization of the non anonymous average rule it is nec-
essary to introduce additional axioms. In particular, we need to be more specific about
the role of individual weights in the collective decision. To do this we introduce a
principle according to which the social choice should only depend on the weighted
distribution of bliss points. In particular, for two populations with different sizes, if
this distribution is identical, then the social choice should be identical. Formally, we
define the weighted cumulative distribution, L , associated to a preference and weight
profile (R, w) ∈ ∪∞n=1S Pn × Sn−1 by
L(b : R, w) =
∑
i |bi ≤b
wi , ∀ b ∈ [0, 1].
We now introduce the distribution invariance axiom.
Definition 2.6 A social choice rule f satisfies the distribution invariance axiom if
for any (R, w), (R′, w′) ∈ ∪∞n=1S Pn × Sn−1, if L(. : R, w) = L(. : R′, w′), then
f (R, w) = f (R′, w′).
6 In the location literature, Holzman (1990) proposes an axiom that singles out the equal weight average
rule among all unanimous rule. To quote the author, “It is a Lipschitz condition which can be understood
as a strong type of continuity requirement: the solution should not be too sensitive to small changes in the
data (perhaps due to errors of measurement)”.
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To illustrate the relevance of this axiom,7 let us consider the example of the US sen-
ate where each senator represents half a state. Suppose that the weight of each senator
is given by the relative share of his constituency in the US population. Now suppose
that we switch to direct democracy in which each American has the same weight and
that in each constituency, the whole population expresses the same opinion as that of
its senator. Then the axiom requires that the social choice should be unchanged.
The statement of our first result requires a technical continuity axiom which is the
following.
Definition 2.7 A social choice rule f is weight-continuous if, for any n, for any
R ∈ S Pn, f (R, .) is continuous in w on Sn−1.
It is easily checked that the four axioms, unanimity, cancellation of opposite changes
in preferences, distribution-invariance and weight-continuity are mutually indepen-
dent.8
The following proposition provides an axiomatic characterization of the weighted
average social choice rule.9
Proposition 2.1 A social rule f : ∪∞n=1S Pn × Sn−1 → [0, 1] is weight continuous,
unanimous, distribution-invariant and satisfies cancellation of opposite changes
of preferences if and only if it is the weighted average rule fwa.
If the average rule is selected we are left with the problem of implementation since
it is clearly not strategy-proof. Furthermore it is not Nash implementable since it does
not satisfy the monotonicity criterion of Maskin (1985). This raises the question of
what would be the social decision if, in spite of these implementation difficulties, the
average rule was applied to expressed opinions rather than to actual ones. This issue
is addressed in subsequent section, taking account of the potential strategic behavior
of voters.
3 The equilibrium outcome
We start with a brief description of the average voting game along with an overview
of existing results. Henceforth notation is simplified so that bi denotes voter i’s bliss
point. There are n voters with singlepeaked preferences over the choice space which
is the unit interval. Each voter i chooses a vote denoted si in [0, 1] and voting involves




wi si , (1)
7 Clearly, the axiom is only meaningful if the weights emerge from a normative analysis.
8 f1(.) = [
∑
i wi b(Ri )]2 satisfies all axioms but unanimity. f2(.) =
√∑
i wi b(Ri )
2 satisfies all axi-
oms but cancellation. f3(.) = fa satisfies all axioms but invariance. f4(.) = fwa for wi rational for all
i, f4(.) = f2 for wi irrational for some i satisfies all axioms but weight-continuity.
9 Aczel and Wagner (1981) offer an axiomatic characterization of the set of all possible weighted average
rules where there is no a-priori specification of the weights. Their result however does not apply to a one
dimensional problem.
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where wi ≥ 0 is the relative weight of voter i , for any i , and ∑ni=1 wi = 1.
To understand how agents behave in a Nash equilibrium, it is useful to describe best
responses. Other player’s choices are only relevant to player i through an aggregate
vote. Let S−i be the weighted sum of votes by voters other than i , that is, S−i =∑
j 	=i w j s j . Then agent i’s best response is defined by




1 if bi − S−i > wi
bi −S−i
wi
if 0 ≤ bi − S−i ≤ wi
0 if bi − S−i < 0
(2)
If the aggregate vote by others is below the bliss point bi two situations are possible,
depending on the size of the discrepancy. If it is larger than agent i’ s weight, it is
optimal to pick the largest possible vote which is 1. If the difference is smaller, agent
i’s weight in the average vote, wi , enables him to make up for the discrepancy, in
which case he obtains his exact bliss point as the final outcome. If the aggregate vote
by others yields a value that is above the bliss point, it is optimal to vote 0 since any
non zero vote would make the situation worse.
The characterization of the equilibrium outcome requires that individuals be ranked






i∗ = min{i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; Wi ≥ bi+1} with bn+1 = 0.
In order to state existing results regarding the equilibrium of the average voting
game, we first give two definitions. We define the median of a finite set of real num-
bers A with N elements as the smallest number med(A) ∈ A that satisfies
1
N





#{a ∈ A : a ≥ med(A)} ≥ 1
2
(3)
If N is odd, condition (3) defines a unique number while if it is even, there are 2 such
numbers. We adopt the convention that the median is the smallest.
We also define a strong Nash equilibrium. Let C be a coalition i.e. a subset of
the set of voters, and let
_
C the complement of C in the set of voters. The n-tuple
s∗ = (s∗1 , . . . , s∗n ) is a pure-strategy strong Nash equilibrium if for all coalitions C






















⎟⎠ for all i ∈ C
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where ui denotes voter i’s utility. The above expression means that the n-tuple s∗ is a
best response for any coalition of players.
Proposition 3.1 The average voting game has a Nash equilibrium. The Nash equi-
librium allocation is unique and may be described by the following two equivalent
formulas:
y∗ = min{bi∗ , Wi∗}. (i)
y∗ = med(b1, . . . , bn, W1, . . . , Wn−1) (ii)
Furthermore any Nash equilibrium is strong Nash.
The two characterizations are established in Renault and Trannoy (2005a) and the
argument showing that any Nash equilibrium of this game is strong Nash can be found
in Bilodeau (1994).10 Since, as Bernheim et al. (1987) point out, any Strong Nash
equilibrium is coalition-proof, any Nash equilibrium of this game is also coalition-
proof. The first characterization sheds light on the cut-off point represented by the
bliss point of individual i∗. She is able to obtain her preferred option if it is smaller
than the cumulative wealth of individuals whose preferred option is on her left on the
unit interval.
It is quite uncommon that a strategic reasoning leads to a formula that can be
obtained through a normative analysis. Indeed, characterization (ii) bears a striking
resemblance with the extended median of Moulin (1980)11 who shows that a social
choice rule, f , is peak-only (i.e. the sole relevant information about preferences for the
social choice rule is the list of bliss points), strategy-proof, anonymous and efficient if
and only if there exist n −1 parameters in [0, 1], a1, . . . , an−1 such that for all profiles
of single peaked preferences, R,
f (R) = med{b(R1), . . . , b(Rn), a1, . . . , an−1}.
In this definition, the parameters a1, . . . , an−1 are independent of the preference
profile under consideration while the parameters W1, . . . , Wn−1 typically depend on
how the bliss points are ranked. Note that, however, if weights are identical, charac-










the ordering of bliss points turns out to be. To our knowledge this voting procedure
provides the first illustration of how the parameters of an extended median may have
an economic interpretation, namely as population shares. Here the uniform distribu-
tion corresponds to an equal treatment of individuals. The careful reader will notice
10 The uniqueness result is reminiscent of Gerber and Ortuno-Ortin (1998) who find, in a similar game
with a continuum of agents that there exists a unique strong Nash equilibrium in which voters use cut points
strategies. The unique strong Nash allocation is also a core allocation, when the core definition keeps in
line with the literature on voting games with the majority rule (see for instance Ordeshook 1986).
11 See also Sprumont (1995) for a detailed survey of this material.
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are related to the outcome of the social choice
for some specific profiles of preferences. More precisely it is easily checked that n−in
is the outcome of the extended median rule when n − i (respectively i) individuals
have 1 (resp. 0) as bliss points. It is also the average taste for this profile. Since, in this
case, no individual wants to manipulate his vote when faced with the average voting
procedure, the outcome of this procedure will coincide with the true mean of bliss
points. The same kind of remarks applies for the non-anonymous case at the price of
some additional complexity.
We now turn to our main focus, which is an evaluation of how much strategic behav-
ior distorts the outcome of the vote from the average taste. To this end, the remainder
of the paper considers the average voting game with a large population of voters. For
the following, the reader needs to remember that in equilibrium, all those with bliss
points strictly above the equilibrium allocation vote 1 while all those with bliss points
strictly below the equilibrium allocation vote 0.
4 Assessing the strategic bias with a large population of voters
4.1 Inferring the average taste from aggregate data
Although we assume in this section that weights and bliss points are common knowl-
edge for the voters, this common knowledge may not be shared by an outside observer.
He may only have some aggregate knowledge, namely, he does not know any more
than the joint probability distribution of bliss points and weights. From this point of
view, it is relevant to provide an approximation of the equilibrium outcome which
requires only the knowledge of this probability distribution when the population is
large enough. Correlation between bliss points and weights is allowed since it may be
present in all practical applications.
To proceed with the limit argument, we need to derive a simple expression for the
limit of the weighted average taste. Bold characters denote random variables. A vote
with n participants is given by n independent draws from a probability distribution P
defined on [0, 1] ×R++ admitting a continuous density. For each player i, the first
component is his bliss point bi and the second component is his absolute weight ωi ,
which contrary to relative weight wi = ωi/∑ni=1ωi is not restricted to be in [0,1].12
Let F denote the marginal c.d.f. of bi and let J (. | bi ) be the conditional c.d.f. of
ωi . We further assume that the conditional distributions have finite mean for all val-
ues of conditioning variables. Let μ(b) denote the conditional mean and μ denote







ωd J (ω | bi )d F(bi ) = μ−1
1∫
y
μ(bi )d F(bi ). (4)
12 Specifying absolute weights is convenient because, contrary to relative weights, they may be drawn
independently, and we may therefore resort to the law of large numbers in the proofs.
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This function is decreasing from H(0) = 1 to H(1) = 0. It measures the expected
relative cumulative weight of individuals with bliss points in excess of y. In the special
case where weights are independent from bliss points, we have H(y) = 1 − F(y).
In the general case, the function H may be also related to F thanks to a concentration
curve. Whenever we plot shares of a variable X against quantiles in the distribution
of a variable Y , the result is called a concentration curve for X with respect to Y . Now
define G as the function that, for all y ∈ [0, 1], maps 1 − F(y) into H(y) so that
H(y) = G(1 − F(y)).
Note that 1 − F(y) is the expected cumulative proportion of the population with bliss
points above y, while H(y) is the expected cumulative relative weight of this sub-
population. The function G may therefore be viewed as the concentration curve for
weights with respect to bliss points.
The function H, which plays a critical role in the paper, may first be used to derive
a simple characterization of the limit of the average taste as the population becomes
large.
Claim 4.1 The weighted average taste for n voters νn = ∑ni=1 wi bi converges to
ν = ∫ 10 H(b)db with probability 1 when n goes to infinity.
This result generalizes the well known formula for the expected value of a random
variable with c.d.f. F as
∫ 1
0 (1 − F(t))dt. The generalization we consider here allows
for different realizations of a random variable to be weighted differently.
As we now show, the function H may also be used to construct an approximation
for the Nash outcome of average voting.
4.2 Inferring the Nash outcome from aggregate data
Let Fn, Jn(. | bi ), μn(bi ), μn and Hn(y) be the empirical counterparts of F, J (. | bi ),




μn(bi )d Fn(bi ) =
∑n
i=1 ωi I (bi ≥ y)∑n
i=1 ωi
,
so that it measures the relative cumulative weight of agents with bliss points of at least
y (where I denotes an indicator function). This empirical cumulative weights func-
tion Hn is a decreasing step function which is left-continuous. Points of discontinuity
correspond to realized bliss points {bi }ni=1 and the jump at bi measures the relative
weight of individuals with bliss point bi . From now on, y∗n denotes the equilibrium
allocation when the population size is n and y∗ denotes the unique solution to
y∗ = H(y∗) = G[1 − F(y∗)]. (5)




converges to y∗ with probability 1.
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In the limit, votes are concentrated at the extremes, 0 or 1, so that the outcome is
given by the cumulative weight of those voting 1, H(y∗), and it is also equal to the
bliss point of the pivotal individual, y∗.
An interesting special case of the above result is when weights ωi are independent
of bliss points bi . Then, μ(bi ) = μ for all bi . Here the game is anonymous in expec-
tation in the sense that the expected weight of individuals is the same no matter what
their tastes might be. Therefore, from (4), H(y) = 1 − F(y). Thus y∗ is defined by
the simple fixed point relation
y∗ = 1 − F(y∗).
The approximations that we have derived for the average taste and the Nash outcome
are quite simple and may be used to evaluate the extent of the strategic bias.
4.3 Strategic bias
We now investigate what are the boundaries on the deviation from the average bliss
point caused by strategic voting. To this end we establish the following proposition
pertaining to the sign and magnitude of the strategic bias, i.e. the gap between the
average voting outcome and the average taste ν = ∫ 10 H(b)db.
Proposition 4.2 (i) For any H, 1 − √1 − ν ≤ y∗ ≤ √ν.
(ii) Furthermore, if H is strictly convex, then y∗ ≥ ν, while if H is strictly concave
the inequality is reversed.
The first result provides bounds on the value of the Nash outcome as a function
of the average taste. As shown by the proof of the above proposition, the obtained
bounds are tight in the sense that it is always possible to specify a continuous function
H such that the average voting outcome is arbitrarily close to one of these bounds.
The largest possible interval is obtained for a mean of 1/2, in which case the lowest
possible Nash outcome is 1 − √1/2 and the largest is √1/2. Thus, average voting
guarantees that if the average taste is moderate, the collective choice cannot be too
extreme. In this particular configuration, the allowed interval for the average vote out-
come is symmetric with respect to the average taste, a property that is lost when the
average taste is closer to 0 or 1. Indeed, players who have an opinion farthest from the
boundaries of the choice space can pull the outcome towards their preferred opinion
very effectively, since they may hugely distort their expressed opinion from the true
one by casting an extreme vote. Thus, for instance, if the average taste is below 1/2,
the largest potential upward bias is greater than the largest potential downward bias.
The second result provides some hint as to how the sign of the strategic bias is related
to the skewness of the weighted distribution of bliss points: concavity or convexity
of H corresponding to the extreme cases of a monotonically increasing or decreasing
density. If the distribution is skewed to the right so that the top part of H tends to be
convex, the bias should be expected to be upwards. This is because the mean is close
to zero so that those who favor an outcome below the mean have only a limited ability
to distort their vote; the most they can do is to vote zero. By contrast, those who favor
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Fig. 1 The thick lines (resp. thin lines) represents the allowed interval for the majority (resp. average)
outcome in function the average taste
an outcome above the mean have bliss points remote from 1 so that they may hugely
exaggerate their taste.
Since the set of all allowed values for the average voting outcome is fairly large, one
may wonder whether it is narrower than the set of allowed values for the outcome of
the majority vote. Here, the relevant majority vote is one where each voter is weighted












with the convention that if there are two such numbers the smallest will be selected.
It is straightforward to establish that when n converges to infinity, mn converges
with probability 1 to m defined by
H(m) = 1/2.
The proof of the following proposition is similar to the proof of (i) in the previous
proposition.
Proposition 4.3 Max(0, 2ν − 1) ≤ m ≤ Min(1, 2ν).
The comparison of the intervals in Propositions 4.2(i) and 4.3 leads to mixed con-
clusions about the merits of average voting relatively to the weighted majority vote in
reflecting the average taste. It is readily verified (see Fig. 1 for an illustration) that the
allowed interval for the average outcome is strictly included in that for the weighted
median as long as the average taste is strictly between 1/4 and 3/4. The advantage of
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the average voting rule over majority voting is especially telling in this case, since
the magnitude of the interval and therefore of the potential discrepancy between the
average taste and the outcome of the vote is maximal. For a smaller average taste,
both the lower and upper bound on y∗ are strictly above the bounds on the median.
The opposite configuration prevails for an average taste above 3/4. In these two cases,
neither interval is a subset of the other.13 Then, as the average taste approaches either
end point, no clear-cut conclusion about the relative merit of the average vote may be
drawn. Nevertheless, the potential distortion from the average taste is less of an issue
as the average gets closer to one end, since the allowed intervals for both the average
vote and the majority vote outcomes become smaller.14
We conclude that if the average taste is located close to 0 or 1, the average voting
rule is hampered by the excessive strategic power of voters whose bliss points are in
the center. One way to remedy this is to limit the set of possible votes as is done in
actual applications of the average voting rule in Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Finally it should be noted that a comparison of the allowed interval for the two
possible outcomes is relevant only if the policy-maker has a poor information about
the underlying distribution of bliss points and weights that generates the function H .
It may well be that, for a specific distribution, the outcome of the average vote does
worse than the outcome of majority voting in approximating the average taste even
though the latter falls in [1/4, 3/4]. Consider for instance the case of a population
comprised of two subgroups: 60% are drawn according to a continuous uniform prob-
ability distribution on the support [0, .4] and there is a mass point of 40% at .4. The
outcome with the average vote is .4, whereas the weighted median is about .33 which
is closer to the mean .28.
5 Conclusion
The average voting rule is an example of a voting procedure that is used in various con-
texts even though it is not immune to strategic manipulation. Typically, voters choose
to cast extreme votes. Our focus here is on the extent of this strategic manipulation
as it is reflected in the discrepancy between the outcome of the vote and the average
taste. The outcome of the average voting game may easily be compared with the mean
of the populations’ true opinions when the population is large enough. It is possible
to establish that the outcome of average voting lies in some interval containing the
average taste. The strategic bias may then be evaluated by comparing this interval
with the range of potential outcomes for majority voting. If the average taste is not
too extreme, then the range of potential outcomes for average voting is included in
the corresponding range for majority voting. For more extreme average tastes, neither
voting procedure dominates the other but they both yield outcomes that may not be
too remote from the average taste.
13 It can be mentioned that the length of the interval for the average vote is smaller than that of the weighted
majority vote for ν ∈ [0.157, 0.843].
14 This, however, is not true in relative terms since the ratio of the largest possible average vote outcome
to the mean tends to infinity as the mean tends to zero.
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In all the analysis, whatever it is normative or strategic, weights are given. It is clear
that more work is needed to make weights part of the design of the mechanism. It is
a possible avenue for further research.
The more general message that we wish to convey is that, although truthful imple-
mentation is a desirable property for a social choice rule, imposing such a require-
ment may lead to an excessive impoverishment of social choice theory. A differ-
ent approach exemplified by this paper would be to compare the relative merits
of the outcomes of different voting procedures whatever their strategic properties
may be.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
source are credited.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
It is straightforward to check that the weighted average rule satisfies all axioms. It is
now shown that is the only one.
First note that cancellation of opposite changes in preferences implies that the social
choice rule is peak-only, i.e. ∀R, R′ ∈ S Pn with w = w′, f (R) = f (R′) whenever
b(Ri ) = b(R′i ) ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
It is first shown that for rational weights, the first three axioms uniquely define fwa .
Consider a population of size n for which preferences and weights are given by (R, w)
where w is comprised of rational numbers. It is straightforward to show that there exists
a population with size n′ with preferences and weights given by (R′, 1n′ , . . . ,
1
n′ ) such
that L(. : R, w) = L(. : R′, 1n′ , . . . , 1n′ ).
Let Ra ∈ S Pn′ be a profile such that b(Rai ) = fa(R′), ∀i = 1, . . . , n′. By the
theorem of Hardy, Littlewood and Polya theorem (1952) used in inequality measure-
ment, there exists a finite sequence of preference profiles (R1, . . . , R, . . . , Rm) with
R1 = R′ and Rm = Ra with the following property: for all  < m, there exist j and
k such that b(Ri ) = b(R+1i )∀i 	= j, k and b(R+1j ) − b(Rj ) = b(Rk) − b(R+1k ).
By cancellation of opposite changes, we must have f (R′) = f (Ra). Peak-only and
unanimity imply that f (Ra) = fa(R′). Thus f (R′) = fa(R′). Now, from distribu-
tion-invariance, f (R′, 1n′ , . . . ,
1
n′ ) = f (R, w) Since fa(R′) = fwa(R, w), we have
f (R, w) = fwa(R, w).
Since rationals are dense in the real line, weight-continuity allows to show that the
result holds for any vector of real weights. unionsq
A.2 Proof of Claim 4.1




. The top expression has expectation n
∫ 1
0 bμ(b)d F(b) which,





has expectation nμ, the result follows from the strong law of large numbers. unionsq
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.1
For any y ∈ [0, 1], let Hn(y+) denote the limit on the right of Hn at y which corre-
sponds to the cumulative weight of individuals with bliss points strictly exceeding y.
Since in equilibrium, those with bliss points strictly above y∗n vote 1 and only those
with bliss points of at least y∗n may have a strictly positive vote,
Hn(y
∗
n+) ≤ y∗n ≤ Hn(y∗n ).
Thus if {Hn} converges uniformly to H with probability 1, since H is continuous, {yn}
must converge to y∗ with probability 1. In the remainder of the proof, we establish
the uniform convergence of {Hn} to H with probability 1.15
Let us first rewrite Hn(y) as
Hn(y) =
∑n




where I is an indicator function. Random variables ωi I (bi ≥ y) are drawn indepen-
dently from an identical distribution with mean
∫ 1
y μ(b)d F(b). Applying the strong
law of large numbers to {ωi I (bi ≥ y)} and {ωi } yields that {Hn(y)} converges to
H(y) with probability 1 for all y rational. Thus these countably many events are true
with probability 1.
Finally, standard arguments may be used to establish that since Hn is monotonically
decreasing on [0, 1] for all n and H is continuous on [0, 1], pointwise convergence of
{Hn} to H for a dense subset of [0, 1] containing 0 and 1, implies uniform convergence
on [0, 1].16
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2
To prove (i), let us show that
y∗2 ≤ ν ≤ 2y∗ − y∗2












15 The following proof is adapted from that of Lemma 2 in Goldie (1977).
16 See Lemma 1 in Goldie (1977) for an analogous result.
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Using the definition of y∗, since H is decreasing, H is bounded below by the step
function taking a value of y∗ on [0, y∗] and 0 on (y∗, 1]. Similarly, it is bounded above
by the step function taking a value of 1 on [0, y∗] and y∗ on (y∗, 1]. The result follows.
(ii) Once again, let us use equation (7). Now, if H is convex, it is bounded above
by the piecewise linear function taking values 1 + y∗−1y∗ x for x ∈ [0, y∗] and − y
∗
y∗−1
+ y∗y∗−1 x for x ∈ (y∗, 1]. The result follows. A similar argument proves the result for
H concave. unionsq
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